





Targeting meeting D12

DISCLAIMER: This is for multiplayer online gaming using the Digital Combat Systems simulation software published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.



WEATHER

D12.1: Day, overcast, winds from North-East D12.2: Day, overcast, rain, winds from North-East D13.1: Day, clear skies, winds from North-East D13.2: Day into night, clear skies, winds from North-East D14.1: Day, scattered/broken, winds from North-East D14.2: Night, overcast, winds from North-East D15.1: Day, scattered, winds from North-east D15.2: Day into night, clear skies, winds from North-East

Explanation:

• Green: Good conditions, VFR, easy to spot targets from all altitudes. No impact on tactics

RESPONSIBLE: VIS

- Yellow: Can be challenging to spot targets from high altitude due to clouds / low visibility. May have impact on tactics
- Red: Overcast and/or other conditions that make acquiring targets difficult. Will have impact on tactics





SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

RESPONSIBLE: VIS


Significant events:

- Downing of RUS TU-22 (1)
- Amphibious assault
 2
- Strike at Palmyra runway 3
- Strike at Syrian Air Defence Academy (4)






ENEMY SITUATION (GROUND)





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OR

artillery.

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Overall

- 2x Russian TU-22 destroyed
- 4x Syrian SU-27 destroyed
- 1x Syrian MiG-23 destroyed
- 5x Syrian MiG-25 destroyed
- 7x Syrian MiG-29 destroyed
- 12x Coalition aircraft lost (1xA10, 8xF16, 3xF/A-18C)
- ALMOST CERTAIN Bassel Al-Assad used by Russian forces.
 LIKELY composition and strength: 8x SU-27 4x SU-34 1x IL-76
- ALMOST CERTAIN Beirut used by Chinese forces. LIKELY composition and strength:

12x MiG-29 or equivalent 2x J-11 or equivalent 2x H6-J 4x IL-76

- 1x A-50
- ALMOST CERTAIN Rayak used by Chinese forces. LIKELY composition and strength:


1x AN-30 2x WL-1





Syrian activity

- Syrians destroyed 9x Coalition aircraft
- Syrian air activity limited to VERY LIKELY CAP and QRA.
- Tabqa airfield HIGHLY LIKELY abandoned. EVEN CHANCE that it is remaining an important airfield.
 - Aircraft HIGHLY LIKELY moved to Palmyra
 - Repairs of runway in previous days
 - IADS presence
- HIGHLY LIKELY aircraft from TABQA spotted at Palmyra airbase








Russian activity

- 2x Russian TU-22 destroyed
- 1x Coalition F/A-18C engaged and destroyed during intercept
- Various CAP areas observed
- Ongoing low level TU-142 patrols overhead Russian fleet
- Russian AWACS activity South of Cyprus
- LIKELY Russian activity originating out of Egypt or other locations in that area.
- EVEN CHANCE 4x Syrian or Russian aircraft were moved from An Nasiriyah to Al Quasyr.








Russian activity

- Russia declared a no-fly zone south of Cyprus in response to the loss of the 2x TU-22 covering the Cyprus invasion area as well as their area of operations.
- Severe risk-increase for Coalition operations south of Cyprus







Chinese activity

- Continued Chinese air activity around Cyprus including use of (armed) drones
- LIKELY reconaissance drones used to gather intel about Southern Cyprus airfields (Akrotiri, Larnaca, Kingsfield).
- HIGHLY LIKELY AN-30 activity from Rayak to Larnaca and back
- UNIDENTIFIED aircraft operation out of Beirut close to Chinese (?) fleet.





- 2x Russian TU-22 destroyed
- 4x Russian SU-27 destroyed
- 1x Syrian MiG-23 destroyed
- 5x Syrian MiG-25 destroyed
- 7x Syrian MiG-29 destroyed

Location	Fraction	Status	Last Attack	J-11	MiG-21	MiG-23	MiG-25	MiG-29	SU-24	SU-27	SU-33	SU-34	H-6J	A-50	AN-26B	AN-30	IL-76	WL-1	YAK-40	Unknown	Total
Abu al-Duhur	Syria	OPERATIONAL			0																0
Al Dumary Mil	Syria	OPERATIONAL			12										6				6		24
Al Quasayr AB	Syria	OPERATIONAL				0-2														4	4-6
An Nasiriyah AB	Syria	OPERATIONAL					9-10	12-24													21-34
Bassel Al-Assad	Russia	OPERATIONAL								4		4					1				9
Beirut Intl	China	OPERATIONAL		2				12					2	1			4				21
Deir-es-Zor AB	Syria	OPERATIONAL						0-1													0-1
Hama Mil AB	Syria	REPAIRS-ONGOING	???		10																10
Khalkhalah AB	Syria	OPERATIONAL			0-24			0-12													0-36
Marj Ruhayl	Syria	OPERATIONAL			0-24				7												7-31
Palmyra	Syria	INOP	D11.2 (6d)				2-3	0-4	12												14-31
Rayak AB	China	OPERATIONAL														1		2			3
Shayrat AB	Syria	OPERATIONAL				0-4															0-4
Tabqa AB	Syria	INOP	D11.1 (6d)																		0
Tiyas AB	Syria	OPERATIONAL						3-15													3-15
TOTAL				2	22-70	0-6	11-13	27-68	19	4	0	4	2	1	6	1	5	2	6	4	116-225




ENEMY SITUATION (IADS)



• Important Events during D11: Sector East

- 1 SA-6 STR destroyed at Tabqa AB
 - Only Remaining SAM IVO Tabqa is a possible SA-11, VIS assessed UNLIKELY to be present
- 2 SA-2 Site at Palmyra AB reported to be missing STR. BDA unknown.
- 2 2x SA-15 destroyed at Palmyra AB
 - Point defences at the airbase may indicate HVT in the area, possibly backup SCC East
- ③ SA-15 and SA-8 spotted NNW from Kharab Ishk
- 4 Raqqa Vehicle Factory (SA-2) assembly plants destroyed








ENEMY SITUATION (IADS)


- Important Events during D11: Sector West
 - 1 Strike on SYTGT062 (Syrian Air Defence Academy):
 - Total Strength estimated at:
 - 1x SA-11 BN (= 2x BY)
 - 1x SA-6 BN
 - BDA:
 - 1x SA-11 SR
 - Units left post-strike:
 - 4x SA-11 TELAR
 - 1x SA-11 SR
 - 1x SA-6 BN (1x STR, 4x TEL)
 - In accordance with VID INTSUM D11 2.3.1 VIS assesses that remaining SA-11 and SA-6 systems will be deployed away from SYTGT062 before or during D12
 - VIS does not recommend further strikes on SYTGT062 at this time







- Important Events during D11: Sector West
 SA-2 and SA-15 spotted at Al Qusayr
- Important Events during D11: Sector South
 (3) SA-2 and SA-11 spotted at Shayrat AB
 - BDA:
 - 3x SA-11 TELAR
 - 1x SA-11 SR
 - 1x SA-15
 - Units left post strike
 - 1x SA-11 TELAR (assuming full BN present)
 - Unknown amount of SA-15 (D11.2-19)
 - Possible SA-2







• Important Events during D11.1

- Multiple engagements of coalition aircraft by Slava-Class radar
- AShM attack against CSG-1. Minimum of 8 seaskimming missiles. No hits on coalition warships
- 2x Tu-142 BEAR ASW/Maritime patrol aircraft active over Russian Amphibious force, low flight profile suggests ASW role
- Important Events during D11.2
 - Large-scale Russian activity over cyprus
 - 3x Ropucha-Class reported offloading armoured vehicles IVO RAF Akrotiri
 - No reports of an exchange of fire visible from the air


2.2.1 Russian amphibious landing ship (Ropucha) capacity

VID have the following assessment of the capacity of Russian landing ship Ropucha: The Ropucha is LIKELY able to carry the following:

- A mechanized/motorized/armored company (9x IFV/APC/Tanks, plus logistics) OR
- 3x MBT, 3x 2S9 Nona artillery and 5x MTLB APC and logistics support vehicles (Amphibious company task group. A self sufficient combat unit)

2.2.2 Chinese landing ships (Type 071 Amphibious transport dock) capacity

VID have the following assessment of the capacity of Chinese landing ships: A Type 071 is LIKELY able to carry one battalion of ground forces, supported by a battery of artillery.









- Increasing escalation between Russian and Coalition forces.
- After the Russian airborne/maritime landing near Akrotiri, another possible landing LIKELY to occur near Lanarca (ships approaching the coast).
- On D11 Russians engaged coalition forces (e.g. F-16 into Incirlik and AWACS) and splashed 1x Coalition aircraft.
- Assessment Russian POSSIBLE COA from D10 became reality on D11 (invasion of Cyprus)
- VIS AIR highly recommends classification of Russia as ENEMY.
- VIS AIR <u>highly</u> recommends preparation against possible action out of Bassel-AI Assad and/or carrier group expecting to arrive in the AO on D14.
- VIS AIR recommends preparation of plans to counter possible Chinese intervention.







- A strong Russian/Chinese presense on Cyprus, maybe together with an IADS package, could severely hinder Coalition operations from the Carrier and the entire EMED.
- Russia continues to conduct bomber missions approaching the Carrier; HIGHLY LIKELY testing coalition reaction
 or as a show of force.
- If a Russian strike against the coalition carrier group or land assets was a pre-planned course of action, VIS
 would assess LIKELY for such a strike. VID report from D10:
 - Unusual very low activity around Russian and Chinese bomber bases outside EMED in the last 24hrs.
 - Level of activity LIKELY to be connected with increased maintenance action on aircraft.
 - EVEN CHANCE that this is preventive maintenance to prepare aircraft for higher activity or maintenance after high activity level after last week.
- China still passive conducting LIKELY reconaissance flights South of Cyprus.






ENEMY COA



IADS MOST LIKELY COA:

VIS assesses the high concentration of SAMs around the Shayrat-Tiyas-Palmyra line (see below) to be indicative of high value of these airfields to Syrian forces. With some attrition of these SAMs systems VIS assesses that at some if not all of the units deploying form SYTGT062 will reinforce these airfields. VIS assesses that these Units will be controlled by either SCC South or backup SCC East.

Yellow: SAM positions Pink: SAM WEZs



MOST DANGEROUS COA:

VIS assesses a large-scale effort to push MERAD units (SA-11, SA-6) further north (Tabqa, Tal Siman, Kharab Ishk) a significant threat to coalition aircraft operating in the area.





VIS recommends strike on SYTGT062 (Air defence academy) **ASAP** (TST, 1-3 days) to destroy 1x SA-11 BN and 1x SA-6 BN that arrived on D10 (VID INTSUM D10 2.3.2) (VIS assessed priority **A**). VIS assess likely location to be "Advanced training area".

Additionally 4x SA-6 Launcher + 1xSA-6 SR and 4x SA-11 Launcher are LIKELY on the way or at SYTGT062

VIS recommends ISR and, if confirmed, Strike on SCC East LIKELY located at Palmyra AB (VIS assessed priority A)

VIS recommends further SEAD/DEAD efforts against any SAMs IVO Tal Siman and Tabqa to deny the use of the airfield and form a permissive environment in the northern half of ADF Sector East to facilitate strikes against Shayrat, Tiyas and Palmyra. (VIS assessed priority B)

VIS recommends DEAD (if confirmed by ISR/ELINT) on SA-3 at Kuweires (VIS assessed priority D).



ENGAGED TARGETS

RESPONSIBLE: VIS

Syrian Army HQ D12/D5.1 Destroyed D5.1 SYrGT002 Syrian Army HQ D1.2/D5.1 Destroyed D5.1 SYrGT037 Syrian 4rmy HQ D1.2 UNKNOWN No reported BDA SYrGT037 Syrian 4rmy HQ D1.2 UNKNOWN No reported BDA SYrGT037 Abu al Duhur Airbase D1.2 UNKNOWN No reported BDA SYrGT041 Abu al Duhur Airbase D2.2 Target was SSC WEST and infrastructure on airfield Reported BDA: "We are not sure of the status of the SCW WEST after the engagement. The statched Screen Stot Shows the status admet BCAC WEST after the engagement. The statched Screen Stot Shows the status admet he attack. Two GBU-31 s were used against the target." "Thing's lating a rabus of the SCR WEST after the engagement. The statched Screen Stot Shows the status admet he attack. Two GBU-31 s were used against the target." "Thing's lating a rabus of the SCR WEST after the engagement. The status of the SCR WEST after the analysis of the SCR WEST after the engagement." "Thing's lating a rabus of the SCR WEST after the engagement." "Thing's lating a rabus of the SCR WEST after the engagement." "Thing's lating a rabus of the SCR WEST after the engagement." "Thing's lating a rabus of the SCR WEST after the engagement." "Thing's lating a rabus of the SCR WEST after the engagement." "Thing's lating a rabus of the SCR WEST after the engagement." "Thing's lating a rabus of the SCR WEST after the engagement." "Thing's lating a rabus of the SCR WEST after the engagement." "Thing's lating a rabus of the SCR WEST after the engagementerastrip "Thing's Repo	TGT	NAME	DAY	STATUS	AMPLIFYING INFORMATION
NumberNumberNumberNumberSYTGT075Syrian 1°° Corps BaseD1.2UNKNOWNNo reported BDASYTGT041Abu al Duhur AirbaseD2.2Target was SCC WEST and infrastructure on airfield Reported BDA: "We are not sure of the status of the SCC WEST after the engagement. The attached Screenshot Shows the status after the entatus, Two GBU-31s were used against the attached Screenshot Shows the status after the attack, Two GBU-31s were used against the attached Screenshot Shows the status after the attack, Two GBU-31s were used against the attached Screenshot Shows the status after the attack, Two GBU-31s were used against the attached Screenshot Shows the status after the attack, Two GBU-31s were used against the attached Screenshot Shows the status after the attack, Two GBU-31s were used against the attached Screenshot Shows the status after the attack, Two GBU-31s were used against the attached Screenshot Shows the status after the attack, Two GBU-31s were used against the attached Screenshot Shows the status after the attack, Two GBU-31s were used against the attached Screenshot Shows the status after the attack, Two GBU-31s were used against the attached Screenshot Shows the status after the attack, Two GBU-31s were used against the attached Screenshot Shows the status after the attack, Two GBU-31s were used against the attached Screenshot Shows the status after the attached Screenshot Shows the status after the attack, Two GBU-31s were used against the attached Screenshot Shows the status after the attached Scree	SYTGT001	Syrian Army HQ	D1.2 / D5.1	Destroyed D5.1	
SYTGT041Abu al Duhur AirbaseD2.2D2.2Taget was SCC WEST and infrastructure on airfield Reported BDA: "We are not sure of the status of the SCC WEST after the engagement. The attached screenshot shows the status after the attack. Two GBU-31s were used against the target." "Primary fuel tanks at Abu Al Duhur From our BDA it looks like the tanks took no damage from our GBU-38 that we used."SYTGT040Tabqa airbaseD3.2 D11.1No reported BDA in D11 (Campaign manager)SYTGT044Hama airbaseD3.2 D1.2AR from D9.1" Excavators still on runway. One group hit at the middle of the runway with GBU-38. Other GBU dopped in the northern half of the runway. Fuel depot/Ammo storage hit 	SYTGT002	Syrian Army HQ	D1.2 / D5.1	Destroyed D5.1	
Reported BDA: 'We are not sure of the status of the SCC WEST after the engagement. The attached screenshot shows the status after the attack. Two GBU-31s were used against the target.'' "Primary tuel tanks at Abu Al Duhur From our BDA it looks like the tanks took no damage from our GBU-38 that we used.''SYTG7040Tabqa airbaseD3.2 D1.1No reported BDA on D11 (campaign manager)SYTG7044Hama airbaseD4.2/09.1ARF from D9.1: "Excavators still on runway. One group hit at the middle of the runway with GBU-38. Other GBU dropped in the northern half of the runway. Fuel depol/Ammo storage hit and burning by package members''''''.''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''	SYTGT075	Syrian 1 st Corps Base	D1.2	UNKNOWN	No reported BDA
SYTGT044Hama airbaseD4.2/D9.1D4.2/D9.1AAR from D9.1: "Excavators still on runway. One group hit at the middle of the runway with GBU-38. Other GBU dropped in the northern half of the runway. Fuel depot/Ammo storage hit and burning by package members" "1x Parked MiG21, confirmed destroyed"SYTGT068SCC EastD7.1/D8.1DestroyedVID BDA: VID BDA Tabga D8SYTGT062Syrian Air Defense AcademyD8.2/D11.1SYTGT022Raqqa Vehicle factoryD9.1/D9.2/D.10.1 D11.2DMPI 3, 4, 5, 6 DestroyedReported BDA after D11.2: «DMPI 3, 4, 5, 6 Destroyed»SYTGT011Ragga ammunition factoryD10.1U10.1Reported BDA after 11.1: "Targets destroyed"SYTGT021Tartus Vehicle factoryD10.1/D11.1Kenter ContextReported BDA after 11.1: "Targets destroyed"	SYTGT041	Abu al Duhur Airbase	D2.2		Reported BDA: "We are not sure of the status of the SCC WEST after the engagement. The attached screenshot shows the status after the attack. Two GBU-31s were used against the target." "Primary fuel tanks at Abu Al Duhur From our BDA it looks like the tanks took no damage from
SYTGT068SCC EastD7.1 / D8.1DestroyedMeropred on D11.2: "2x Repair crews on HAMA runway. Don't know if that suggests a level of repair completion."SYTGT062Syrian Air Defense AcademyD8.2 / D1.1VID BDA: VID BDA Tabga D8SYTGT022Raqa Vehicle factoryD9.1 / D9.2 / D.10.1DMPI 3, 4, 5, 6 DestroyedReported BDA after D11.2: «DMPI 3, 4, 5, 6 Destroyed»SYTGT021Tatus Vehicle factoryD10.1Image: Stress on the stress of t	SYTGT040	Tabqa airbase	D3.2 D11.1		No reported BDA on D11 (Campaign manager)
SYTGT062Syrian Air Defense AcademyD8.2 /D11.1DMPI 3, 4, 5, 6 DestroyedSYTGT022Raqqa Vehicle factoryD9.1 / D9.2 /D.10.1 /D11.2DMPI 3, 4, 5, 6 DestroyedReported BDA after D11.2: «DMPI 3, 4, 5, 6 Destroyed»SYTGT011Raga ammunition factoryD10.1	SYTGT044	Hama airbase	D4.2 /D9.1		 GBU-38. Other GBU dropped in the northern half of the runway. Fuel depot/Ammo storage hit and burning by package members" "1x Parked MiG21, confirmed destroyed" Reported on D11.2: "2x Repair crews on HAMA runway. Don't know if that suggests a level of
SYTGT022Raqqa Vehicle factoryD9.1 / D9.2 / D.10.1 /D1.2DMPI 3, 4, 5, 6 DestroyedReported BDA after D11.2: «DMPI 3, 4, 5, 6 Destroyed»SYTGT011Ragga ammunition factoryD10.1	SYTGT068	SCC East	D7.1/D8.1	Destroyed	VID BDA: VID BDA Tabqa D8
Addition/D11.2AdditionSYTGT011Ragga ammunition factoryD10.1SYTGT021Tartus Vehicle factoryD10.1/D11.1SYTGT021Tartus Vehicle factoryD10.1/D11.1	SYTGT062	Syrian Air Defense Academy	D8.2/D11.1		
SYTGT021 Tartus Vehicle factory D10.1/D11.1 Reported BDA after 11.1: "Targets destroyed"	SYTGT022	Raqqa Vehicle factory		DMPI 3, 4, 5, 6 Destroyed	Reported BDA after D11.2: «DMPI 3, 4, 5, 6 Destroyed»
	SYTGT011	Ragga ammunition factory	D10.1		
SVTGT045 Palmyra airbase D11.2 Destroyed INOP for 6 days 6y MK94 imported the rupway confirmed with evaluations (each pilot reported importe of his 2y	SYTGT021	Tartus Vehicle factory	D10.1/D11.1		Reported BDA after 11.1: "Targets destroyed"
MK-84s). Based on VID INTREP 004 (Syria as Candidate for Air Attack) section 6.7.1) this means that the runway in Palmyra will be out of action for 6 days	SYTGT045	Palmyra airbase	D11.2	Destroyed. INOP for 6 days	
SYTGT012 Jirah SW Ammunition Factory D10.1 DPI 1,2,3 and 7 destroyed Reported BDA after D10.1: "SYTGT 012 – DPI 1,2,3 and 7 destroyed"	SYTGT012	Jirah SW Ammunition Factory	D10.1	DPI 1 ,2,3 and 7 destroyed	Reported BDA after D10.1: "SYTGT 012 – DPI 1 ,2,3 and 7 destroyed"



NEW INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS



RESPONSIBLE: ALL

Intelligence Requirement / Information gap	Nominated by	Latest time of value	Justification
Example: Are there any SAMs located at Kuweires	VIS IADS	D9	In order to support LCCs plan, VIS want to ensure there is no SAMs present and Kuweires that can hamper operations against A-G flights in the area
Reconaissance of Akrotiri landing area	VIS AIR		Determine strength and composition of Russian ground forces
Preventive reconaissance of possible Larnaca landing area	VIS AIR		Determine strength and composition of Russian ground forces
Reconaissance and/or strike flight against Hama airfield (10x MiG-21 remaining)	VIS AIR		State of runway and repair efforts
Reconaissance and/or strike flight against Tabqa airfield	VIS AIR		State of runway and repair efforts (IR46.2) Prevent build-up of strong IADS package at the airfield.
Reconaissance flight against Khalkhalah AB	VIS AIR		Find "missing" MiG-21
Reconaissance flight against Marj Ruhayl AB	VIS AIR		Find "missing" MiG-21
			 Basic information that help VIS build a better understanding of the situation Should be put on the VIS IR List, and JFACC should consider the list


• Should be put on the VIS IR List, and JFACC should consider the list when tasking flights, and see if anyone is able to answer some if the Intelligence Requirements that are important to VIS

See <u>VIS TTP</u>, section 4.4.1 Intelligence collection (page 45-48)

DISCLAIMER:




FRIENDLY SITUATION (overall) RESPONSIBLE: JFACC
















OPAR LCC PHASE-2 CONOP



METHOD:

-) Ground maneuver by (x3) efforts:
 - a) **SUPPURTING EFFORT #1 (DECEPTIVE EFFORT) :** Advance South of GAZIANTEP towards MINAKH.
 - a) The purpose is to lure SYR attention and effort to counter an what they would interpret as a LCC advance towards ALEPPO from the North.
 - b) SYR forces redeploying between ALEPPO and MINAKH would then be flanked by the main WESTERN EFFORT and be cut off from the South.
 - a) SUPPORTING EFFORT #2: Advance by the 55th Div from the international border East of the EUPHRATES through TAL-SIMAN to RAQQA
 - a) Seize road bridges over the river and gaining control over the key MSRs extending West, South and East of the area.
 - b) Extended mission (1): Cross the river and seize TABQA airbase.
 - c) Extended mission (2): Extend the maneuver West to threaten JIRAH airbase with indirect fires
 - a) MAIN EFFORT: Advance by the 56th Div from REYHANLI (IVO HATAY) East towards ALEPPO
 - a) Securing the MSRs extending from the city and the airport.
 - b) Advancing East to capture KUWEIRES airbase
 - c) Extended mission (3): Extend the maneuver East towards JIRAH
 - d) Extended mission (4) : Extend the maneuver South towards ABU-AL-DUHUR



NO CHANGE since D11





OPAR LCC PHASE-2 CONOP




METHOD (Cont'):

2) GENERAL TIMELINE:

- a) Deceptive effort starts upon phase initiation (P+0).
- b) Supporting effort #2 initiated P+2 or P+3, followed +1 day later by main effort
- c) Actual timing depends on intel' assessment of SYR responses to each step. Ideally, we'd like to see SYR units redeployed / committed for responding to first two efforts before launching the main effort.
- 2) Decisions regarding effects on enemy air force installations mentioned above will be made depending on their operational state and the potential gains to be made by threatening, denying or seizing them. Those are "Extended missions" of which execution will be determined at decision points based on how the situation develops.

2) DESIRED END STATE

- a) SYR forces between ALEPPO and MINAKH are encircled and surrendering
- b) SYR AF unable to sustain opposition to CJTF North of ABU-AL-DUHUR-TABQA line
- c) SYR army is pinned down to a defensive posture South of ABU-AL-DUHUR and TABQA








DISCLAIMER:



LCC PLAN





NO CHANGE since D11



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AIR REQUESTS (Ground)

RESPONSIBLE: LCC

- CAS in support of offensive towards Sanliurfa (objective 1 and 2)
 - 2x Flights
- CAS in support of offensive toward border (objective 3 and 4)
 - 2x Flights

Both can be changed to AR if no JTAC is signed up for the event

Explanation:

LCCs air request for CAS and AR (and also request for strikes of more strategic targets such as logistics, factories or headquarters that is supportin the enemy ground forces
Air requests can also be followed with request for airspace neeed



AVAILABLE ORDNANCE RESPONSIBLE: JFACC

Ordnance CVN ADDED D12 ADDED DX																	CUR	RENT A	D12.1		
WEAPON	USED BY:	D8			D9.1	D9.2	D10.1	D10.2	D11.1	D11.2	D12.1	D12.2	D13.1	D13.2	D14.1	D14.2	D15.1	D15.2	D16.1	D16.2	Current inventory
AGM-84D (Harpoon)	F/A-18	47																			47
AGM-84E (SLAM)	F/A-18	10																			10
AGM-84H (SLAM ER)	F/A-18	6																			6
AGM-154A	F/A-18, F-16	9	5								6										8
AGM-154C	F/A-18	6	10						2												14
GBU-31(V) 3/B	F/A-18, F-16, A-10	6	20						4		10										12
GBU-31	F/A-18, F-16, A-10	20	10		8		8				7										7
GBU-32	F/A-18	3	15							2											16
GBU-38	F/A-18, F-16, A-10	40	60		10		2	11	3	9	33										32
GBU-54	A-10	5	20			2					23										0
GBU-10	F/A-18, F-16, F-14, A-10	3	30								17										16
GBU-12	F/A-18, F-16,F-14, A-10	47	50		1	4	2	1	9	4	46										30
GBU-16	F/A-18, F-14	0	20																		20
GBU-24	F/A-18, F-16, F-14	10	20								15										15
AGM-65 (all types)	F/A-18, F-16, A-10	42	50		8	11		3	9	6	35										20
Fuel tanks (all types)	F/A-18, F-16, F-14	60	50								40										70
Tomahawk	Cruiser	20																			20
Tomahawk	DDG 1	10																			10
Tomahawk	DDG 2	10																			10

Ordnand	From D8	ADDED D12	ADDED DX													CUR	RENT A	S OF:		D12.1	
WEAPON	USED BY:	D8			D9.1	D9.2	D10.1	D10.2	D11.1	D11.2	D12.1	D12.2	D13.1	D13.2	D14.1	D14.2	D15.1	D15.2	D16.1	D16.2	Current inventory
AGM-84D (Harpoon)	F/A-18	47									47										0
AGM-84E (SLAM)	F/A-18	10									10										0
AGM-84H (SLAM ER)	F/A-18	6									6										0
AGM-154A	F/A-18, F-16	9	5								8										6
AGM-154C	F/A-18	6	10						2		14										0
GBU-31(V) 3/B	F/A-18, F-16, A-10	6	20						4		12										10
GBU-31	F/A-18, F-16, A-10	20	10		8		8				7										7
GBU-32	F/A-18	3	15							2	16										0
GBU-38	F/A-18, F-16, A-10	40	60		10		2	11	3	9	32										33
GBU-54	A-10	5	20			2															23
GBU-10	F/A-18, F-16, F-14, A-10	3	30								16										17
GBU-12	F/A-18, F-16,F-14, A-10	47	50		1	4	2	1	9	4	30										46
GBU-16	F/A-18, F-14	0	20								20										0
GBU-24	F/A-18, F-16, F-14	10	20								15										15
AGM-65 (all types)	F/A-18, F-16, A-10	42	50		8	11		3	9	6	20										35
Fuel tanks (all types)	F/A-18, F-16, F-14	60	50								70										40

Explanation:

Slide of available ordnance

• If ordnance is low, JFACC should submit a request for ammunition (what type, how much, and what is it intended for – should be according to their long term plan)

• IF MCC: Available TLAMs



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ASSETS AVAILABLE



Planning factor:

- TOTAL: 50 sorties (25 flights)
- F-16: 8 flights
- F/A-18: 11 flights
- F-14: 2 flights (1 per event)
- AH-64: 2 flights (1 per event)
- A-10: 2 flights (1 per event)

Explanation:

- · How many sorties are expected to be available
- Based on the best estimates of normal signups
- Used as foundation for the MAAP





DIRECTION & GUIDANCE

RESPONSIBLE: JFC

4.2 MCC:

- Plan for naval units as required¹
 - Protect and operate Carrier
 - Support JFACC with minimum 8 sorties per ATO day
 - Minimum 4 sorties / 2x 2ship flights per event)
 - o Monitor Russian and Chinese activity in the Mediterranean
- Activate and Deploy ARG/MEU as required
 - Currently in harbor in Crete. When activated, will be available after one ATO day. Will then arrive in RV point N35 12.000 E029 46.000
 - Coordinate with LCC for the use of embarked Marine Corps units (Marine Expeditionary Unit, MEU)
 - 3x companies of AAV-7
 - 2x companies of LAV-25
 - 1x company of Abrahams tanks
 - 1x Battery of 109mm Artillery
 - AH-64 (1x AH-64 can takeoff from LPD/LSD, up to 6x AH-64 from the LHA)²
 - AV-8B (Only if externals available)
- Request required ordnance for D12-20
- Plan for when the supply ship need to be in port and when the carrier need to refuel³

4.1 LCC:

- Continue operation to free Gazientiep and free rest of Turkey
- Priority of effort is on 56th Armored Division attack at Gazientep.
- Coordinate with MCC if needing support of Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit (MEU)

4.4 VIS:

- Support JFACC, LCC and MCC planning and execution.
- Be prepared to support JFACC with creating contingency plan for striking Syrian WMD at short notice.
- Recommend to JFC changes in diplomatic status for any country

4.3 JFACC:

- Apportionment⁴
 - DCA: Per JFACC priorities
 - OCA: Minium 50% of sorties should go to OCA (includes Airbase strikes, factories, SEAD/DEAD, etc)
 - o Strike/Air Interdiction: Per JFACC priorities
 - Support LCC: 20%
 - AR: If no JTAC available, support to LCC can be given as AR
 - CAS: Priority of support to LCC should be given as CAS
- Priority of effort is on establishing Air Superiority in support of LCC and set conditions for own operations.
- Start shaping for phase 2 in the operation (Create permissive environment).
- Start strike operations in Syria as applicable.
- Continue support to LCC in effort to free Turkey.
- Be prepared to execute contingency plans for striking Syrian WMD at short notice (regardless of phase).
 - ALR: EXTREME approved for such a plan.
- Phase 2 planning:
 - JFC are working with political leaders to get an agreement to use airbases in Iraq during parts of phase 2. Airbases in question are H3, H3 Northwest. H3 Southwest. JFACC can at some point start contingency planning for using these airbases (Need ATC charts, coordinate with 176th), how can the airbases be used to best support JFACC (what squadrons to be based there?), what targets, or what can be achieved by using these bases.
 - A parallel effort to using the airbases in Iraq is to ensure overflight rights over Lebanon or Israel for any carrier based aircraft.
 - We do not have a time estimate, but it will not happen until Phase 2 at the earliest.
 - o Submit CONOP (Concept of Operations) for phase 2 to CJTF HQ for approval
 - CONOP submitted ASAP to JFC (coordinated with LCC).

Explanation:

JFCs direction & guidance for the next ATO day

• NOTE: JFC in his D&G also gives separate guidance to MCC and LCC. For this presentation it is intended for the guidance to either the entire force or JFACC

DISCLAIMER:



APPORTIONMENT

- Apportionment⁴
 - DCA: Per JFACC priorities
 - OCA: Minium 50% of sorties should go to OCA (includes Airbase strikes, factories, SEAD/DEAD, etc)
 - o Strike/Air Interdiction: Per JFACC priorities
 - Support LCC: 20%
 - AR: If no JTAC available, support to LCC can be given as AR
 - CAS: Priority of support to LCC should be given as CAS

Explanation:

• JFCs apportionment for the next ATO day

• Combine with JFACC assets available to get a understanding of how many flights of each type is available for various tasks


RESPONSIBLE: JFC



JFACC CURRENT PLAN/STRATEGY (Long term) RESPONSIBLE: JFACC

Objective 1: Air Superiority

Strike IADS sector SOUTH




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JFACC CURRENT PLAN/STRATEGY (Short term)



RESPONSIBLE: JFACC





CURRENT PLAN/STRATEGY



1. Move CSG-1 and Cruiser to new position N 35 35.551 E 032 29.060

- 2. Supply ship (SS) position N 36 00.467 E 031 55.123
- 3. Destroyers (DD) position N 35 27.409 E 031 43.670, N 35 43.450 E 033 20.709
- 4. Frigate (FG) position N 35 21.574 E 032 38.553
- 5. Submarine (SSN) N 33 49.120 E 033 03.369 Task is to gather intel of Chinese and Russian units at sea.
- 6. Deploy CAP ALPHA (N 34 38.291 E 032 46.427) 2 event flights
 - F-14 dep event 0 1740z rec event 2 1930z
 - F-18 dep event 1 1830z , rec event 3 2030z
 - F-14 Optional second sortie at event 3 2030z, rec event 4 2130z.
- 7. USS Sacramanto arrival at D12.
 - Request ordnance:
 - 6x GBU-31(V) 3/B
 - 7x GBU-32
 - 7x AGM-65
- 8. CVN refuel and rearm at D12 at sea by USNS Pauxent.



NO CHANGE since D11






CURRENT PLAN/STRATEGY

RESPONSIBLE: MCC

- 1. Move CSG-1 and Cruiser to new position N 35 35.551 E 032 29.060
- 2. Supply ship (SS) position N 36 00.467 E 031 55.123
- 3. Destroyers (DD) position N 35 27.409 E 031 43.670 , N 35 43.450 E 033 20.709
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 - 7x GBU-32
 - 7x AGM-65
- 8. CVN refuel and rearm at D12 at sea by USNS Pauxent.

Carrier based AC limitations for JFACC:

- · Range for CVN based aircraft for a 2 event sortie
- 350kts GS on ascent up to FL250, 450kts GS enrute = 188 NM including 5m playtime; 205 NM max distance no playtime The red circle line is at 200 NM radius from the CSG-1



NO CHANGE since D11





TARGET NOMINATIONS

RESPONSIBLE: ALL

Target	Nominated by	Target priority	Target hit NLT	Justification		
		 Priority A The target is essented a Time 	sential for mission success in sup me Sensitive Target (TST).	upport of current objectives (or is a		
		 It is crucial to the of It will have immed Its timeliness as a If not targeted, nego operations Priority B: Targets have subs The cascading efficient If not targeted on t If not targeted, nego Priority C: It will contribute to 	e overall success of the operation ediate and compelling effects. s an urgent target may not exist in negative consequences may serio ubstantial, but not immediate impa effects this target provides may no in this ATO, a significant level of e negative consequences may signi to the battle, but it is not critical to	in the future. riously jeopardize future CJTF pact on the battle. not be realized in the future. f effort may be required later. inificantly hamper CJTF operations.	• A for	cplanation: All nominations end up on this list, and it forms the basis r JPTL on the next slides when deciding what targets to rike when
		 It will further the sum of the sum	e success of the operation. require targeting due to JFC futu In this ATO, negative consequence	ture plans.		
This is for	multiplayer online gaming using the	 B) As a bac It will have minor of It may be required 	targets not suitable for this ATO.	ritical	s not in any way suits	able for real world use or operations

• If not targeted, no negative consequences

ion is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.



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
TARGET NOMINATIONS

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b	Nominated by (and when)	Target priority	Target hit NLT	Justification	Status				
SYTGT021 (Tartus vehicle V factory)	vis iads (D9)	D	D13	To inhibit SA-15 production prior to D14. 4x SA-15 expected at SYTGT062 (Air defence academy) after D14.	Engaged on D10 BDA: Pending				
	VIS IADS (D9)	С	D11	To inhibit SA-2 production. 6x SA-2 launcher expected at SYTGT062 (Air defence academy) after D12. 6x SA-2 launcher expected at SYTGT062 (Air defence academy) after D12 (VID INTSUM D8 2.3.2). Recommend destruction of any MERAD at or north of Tabqa as prerequisite for mission.	Strike on D10 aborted due to threat				
DEAD against 5 th Corp IVO V Kharab Ishk and Tal Siman	vis iads (D9)	В	Prior to phase 2	To form a permissive environment in the northern half of ADF Sector East in preperation of PHASE 2. (VIS assessed priority B). Contribute to form a permissive environment in the northern half of ADF Sector East to facilitate strikes against Shayrat, Tiyas and Palmyra.	Several sorties on D10 toward 5 th Corps AD BDA: Pending				
SYTGT011 (Raqqa Li Ammunition Factory)	LCC (D9)	С		Factories producing MLRS rockets among other things so hitting them should reduce some MLRS threat	Strike on D10 aborted due to threat				
SYTGT012 (Jirah SW Li Ammunition Factory)	LCC (D9)	С		Factories producing MLRS rockets among other things so hitting them should reduce some MLRS threat	Engaged on D10 (Backup target) BDA: Pending				
SYTGT121 (Raqqa power Li distribution)	LCC (D11)	D	Prior to phase 2	If destroyed it will force any factories IVO Raqqa to reduce production lines 50%	Priority A The target is essential for mission success in support of current objectives (or is a designated a Time Sensitive Target (TST). It is crucial to the overall success of the operation. 				
SYTGT062 (Syrian Air Defence V Academy)	VIS (D11)	A	ASAP	To destroy 1x SA-11 BN and 1x SA-6 BN that arrived on D10 (VID INTSUM D10 2.3.2) (VIS assessed priority A). VIS assesses likely location to be "Advanced training area". Additionally 4x SA-6 Launcher + 1xSA-6 SR and 4x SA-11 Launcher are LIKELY on the way or at SYTGT062	It will have immediate and compelling effects. It is timeliness as an urgent target may not exist in the future. If not targeted, negative consequences may seriously jeopardize future CJTF operations Priority B: Targets have substantial, but not immediate impact on the battle. The cascading effects this target provides may not be realized in the future. If not targeted on this ATO, a significant level of effort may be required later. If not targeted, negative consequences may significantly hamper CJTF operations.				
KUWEIRES SA-3 V	VIS D(11)	D		Neutralize SA-3 at Kuweires	Priority C: • It will contribute to the battle, but it is not critical to mission success. • It will further the success of the operation.				
PALMYRA JI	JFACC (D9)	В	Prior to phase 2	Per JFACC plan	 It will eventually require targeting due to JFC future plans. If not targeted on this ATO, negative consequences will probably not impede operations. 				
TIYAS JI	JFACC (D9)	В	Prior to phase 2	Per JFACC plan	Priority D: • Target of opportunity if: o A) Other targets not suitable for this ATO. o B) As a backup target				
SHAYRAT JI	JFACC (D9)	В	Prior to phase 2	Per JFACC plan NO CHANGE since D11	 It will have minor contributions to the operation. It may be required for targeting but is not time critical. If not targeted, no negative consequences 				



MASTER AIR ATTACK PLAN (MAAP)



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